Sandeep Mehta v. Warden Moshannon Valley Correc by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-29-2015 
Sandeep Mehta v. Warden Moshannon Valley Correc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Sandeep Mehta v. Warden Moshannon Valley Correc" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 107. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/107 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3166 
___________ 
 
SANDEEP MOHAN MEHTA, 
                            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
C.G. WIGEN, WARDEN, MVCC 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-00257) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Lisa Pupo Lenihan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 17, 2014 
 
Before:  AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 29, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Sandeep Mohan Mehta, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the 
order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (“the 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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District Court”) denying his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will vacate the Magistrate Judge’s June 12, 2014 order and 
remand with instructions that the Magistrate Judge grant Mehta’s habeas petition and 
direct the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to credit Mehta’s sentence for the time spent in 
custody in England. 
I. 
 In February 2006, Mehta pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia (“the Sentencing Court”) to conspiracy to defraud the 
United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  In April 2006, he was sentenced to 46 
months in prison, to be followed by a two-year term of supervised release.  He was then 
ordered to report to the Federal Correctional Institution in Allenwood, Pennsylvania, by 
July 11, 2006, to begin serving his sentence.  Mehta failed to report and remained at large 
until he was apprehended in England on July 13, 2010.  He was held in custody in 
England until he was extradited to the United States on March 31, 2011.  In light of his 
failure to report, Mehta was charged in the Sentencing Court with criminal contempt in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3).  He pleaded guilty to that charge in May 2011. 
 Mehta’s sentencing hearing on the criminal contempt charge took place in August 
2011.  At the hearing, the Sentencing Court determined that the advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines range was 8 to 14 months in prison.  A discussion then took place concerning 
whether the BOP would credit Mehta’s criminal contempt sentence for the time that he 
had spent in custody in England: 
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If the defendant wishes to address the Court, he may do so, 
but let me just be up front with you.  One of the things I’m 
going to ask, as I understand it he was held for a year in 
Britain or England awaiting extradition to the United States.  
Evidently he did not readily agree to extradition.  My 
question is going to be, is BOP going to give him credit for 
that time? 
 
(App. at 4.)  In response, the prosecutor stated that he did not believe that the BOP would 
credit Mehta’s sentence for that time.  The court then stated:  “I may double my sentence 
to make sure he doesn’t get credit, or double it and then give him credit and come back 
down to 14 months.”  (Id. at 6.)  The court explained that this computation would, “[i]n 
effect double it and then give him credit, bring it back down and show in the sentence I 
have already given him credit.”  (Id.) 
 The prosecutor argued that the Sentencing Court should impose a sentence of 
between 12 and 14 months.  In doing so, the prosecutor urged the court to take into 
account the fact that the BOP could award the aforementioned time credit.  The court 
acknowledged this point:  “I think I’m going to try to take care of it, but not by adding.”  
(Id. at 29.)  Ultimately, the court imposed a 14-month prison sentence, which would run 
consecutive to Mehta’s 46-month sentence.  In its judgment of sentence, the court 
specifically addressed the issue of the time credit:  “In setting this sentence, the court 
believes that BOP will NOT award credit for the time the defendant spent in custody in 
England from (July 13, 2010 thru March 31, 2011) before extradition.  Otherwise, the 
sentence would have been greater.”  (Appellee’s Supplemental App. at 17.) 
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 Thereafter, Mehta asked the BOP to credit his sentence for his time spent in 
custody in England pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).  That statute provides that 
[a] defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a 
term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official 
detention prior to the date the sentence commences — 
 
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence 
 was imposed; or 
 
 (2) as a result of any other charge for which the 
 defendant was arrested after the commission of 
 the offense for which the sentence was 
 imposed; 
 
that has not been credited against another sentence. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (emphasis added).  The BOP denied Mehta’s request and denied his 
appeals that followed. 
 Next, in December 2012, Mehta, who was (and still is) incarcerated within the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, filed a pro se habeas petition in the District Court 
pursuant to § 2241, challenging the BOP’s denial of the § 3585(b) credit.  After the 
parties agreed to have the case decided by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
§ 636(c), the Government filed its opposition to the petition and Mehta countered with a 
reply.  On June 12, 2014, the Magistrate Judge denied habeas relief.  In doing so, the 
Magistrate Judge stated that the BOP, relying on the language in the 2011 judgment of 
sentence, “interpreted the statute to mean that [Mehta] had already received sentencing 
credit for the time he spent in custody in England and therefore he could not receive 
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additional credit pursuant to § 3585(b).”  (App. at 104.)  The Magistrate Judge concluded 
that this interpretation was reasonable.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1  In reviewing 
the denial of a § 2241 petition, we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal 
conclusions and review its findings of fact for clear error.  O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 
172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that “§ 3585(b) does not 
authorize a district court to compute the credit at sentencing.”  United States v. Wilson, 
503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992).  Rather, the computation is to be made by the Attorney 
General, through the BOP, after the defendant begins his sentence.  See id. at 333-35.   
Here, the BOP denied Mehta’s request for a credit under § 3585(b) because “[t]he 
[S]entencing Court clearly indicate[d] the time period in question was considered and 
applied to the sentence imposed by the Court.”  (App. at 40.)  Assuming for the sake of 
argument that the BOP’s reasoning is subject to “some deference,” see Rios v. Wiley, 
201 F.3d 257, 275 n.16 (3d Cir. 2000), superseded on other grounds as stated in United 
States v. Saintville, 218 F.3d 246, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2000), we nevertheless conclude that 
this reasoning was in error.    
                                              
1 Mehta does not need a certificate of appealability to proceed with this appeal.  See 
United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), abrogated on 
other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012). 
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 The Sentencing Court made clear that it “[did not] want [Mehta] to have credit.”  
(Id. at 6.)  Pursuant to Wilson, however, the court lacked the authority to decide whether 
he was entitled to that credit.  Ultimately, the Sentencing Court did not go so far as to 
grant or deny the credit; however, the court did make its position on the credit known in 
its judgment of sentence, noting that Mehta’s 14-month sentence was based on the 
presumption that the BOP would not grant him credit.  When the BOP eventually denied 
the credit, it essentially did so because the Sentencing Court had already taken the 
position that Mehta should not benefit from the credit. 
 The problem with the BOP’s reasoning is that, because the Sentencing Court never 
had the authority to compute the credit in the first place, the BOP could not rely on the 
court’s position that Mehta should not benefit from the credit as the basis for its denial.  
The Government, however, argues that the Sentencing Court’s actions did not amount to 
a § 3585(b) credit, but rather were merely akin to a sentencing adjustment under U.S.S.G. 
§ 5G1.3(b).  We consider that argument below. 
 Section 5G1.3 concerns the imposition of a sentence when the defendant is subject 
to a previous, undischarged sentence.  See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3.  Under subsection (b), when 
“a term of imprisonment resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to the 
instant offense of conviction,” the sentence for the instant offense must be imposed as 
follows: 
(1) the court shall adjust the sentence for any period of 
imprisonment already served on the undischarged term 
of imprisonment if the court determines that such 
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period of imprisonment will not be credited to the 
federal sentence by the Bureau of Prisons; and 
  
(2) the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to 
run concurrently to the remainder of the undischarged 
term of imprisonment. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b).  In applying this provision, a sentencing court first calculates the 
relevant Guidelines range for the instant offense.  See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 cmt. n.2D.  The 
court then determines what total prison term would be appropriate.  See id.  Finally, the 
court subtracts from that term the amount of time that the defendant has already served 
on his other, undischarged term to arrive at the actual sentence for the instant offense.  
See id.  That sentence is then run concurrent with the undischarged term.  See id. 
 The Government asserts that section 5G1.3(b)(1)’s language, which allows for an 
adjustment “if the court determines that such period of imprisonment will not be credited 
to the federal sentence by the [BOP],” supports the Sentencing Court’s actions because 
“[the court] adjusted Mehta’s sentence on the contempt conviction by taking into account 
the amount of time it believed that the [BOP] would not credit to his sentence.”  
(Appellee’s Br. 18.)  Although this argument may have some appeal at first glance, it is 
not ultimately persuasive.  First, the Government does not argue that section 5G1.3(b) 
itself controls here, and the Government has not demonstrated that any other Guidelines 
provision (or any other authority, for that matter) is on point.  Second, a reviewing court 
(or the BOP) can definitively determine the amount of an adjustment awarded under 
section 5G1.3(b), for it need only determine how much time the defendant has served on 
8 
 
his undischarged sentence.  Here, however, one can only speculate as to the amount of 
the “adjustment” awarded by the Sentencing Court, for it is not clear what sentence the 
court would have imposed had it believed that the BOP would grant Mehta credit under  
§ 3585(b).  Although the Sentencing Court may very well have simply lengthened the 
sentence by the amount of time that Mehta had spent in custody in England, the court 
also seemed to be considering a scenario where his 14-month sentence would be doubled.  
(See App. at 6 (“I may double my sentence to make sure he doesn’t get credit, or double 
it and then give him credit and come back down to 14 months.”).)  Third, whereas section 
5G1.3(b) is mandatory and provides a benefit to the defendant by effectively shortening 
his instant sentence, the Sentencing Court’s actions here were discretionary and designed 
to have Mehta spend more time in prison.  Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the 
Sentencing Court’s actions reflected an “adjustment” akin to the one authorized in section 
5G1.3(b).  
 Given the circumstances of Mehta’s flight and his efforts to contest his extradition 
to the United States, it is certainly understandable that the Sentencing Court did not want 
him to benefit from a § 3585(b) credit.  But as Wilson instructs, the computation of the 
credit is made by the BOP, after the defendant begins his sentence.  Although it was the 
BOP that ultimately ruled on Mehta’s request for a § 3585(b) credit, the BOP should not 
have based its ruling on the actions of the Sentencing Court.2 
                                              
2 Had the Sentencing Court sentenced Mehta to 23 months in prison for the criminal 
contempt charge, a subsequent award of § 3585(b) credit for the approximately nine 
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 In light of the above, we will vacate the Magistrate Judge’s June 12, 2014 order 
and remand with instructions that the Magistrate Judge grant Mehta’s habeas petition and 
direct the BOP to credit Mehta’s sentence for the time spent in custody in England.  
Because it appears that Mehta is scheduled to finish serving his sentence in August 2015, 
we trust that the Magistrate Judge will enter her order swiftly.  
                                                                                                                                                  
months during which he was in custody in England would have left him serving about 14 
months in prison — the same amount of time that he actually faced here.  And, in that 
scenario, there would have been no need for him to file this lawsuit.  Of course, that 
scenario presumes that any appeal by Mehta challenging the 23-month sentence — an 
above-Guidelines sentence — would have been unsuccessful.  We need not, and do not, 
speculate as to whether our sister court in the Eleventh Circuit would have upheld such a 
sentence on direct appeal.   
